By Laura Gamboa
The United States is in a rapid process of democratic erosion. Despite its limitations, until January 2025 it had a democratic regime with relatively free and fair elections (more in some states than others), universal suffrage, absence of tutelary authorities, protection of political rights and civil liberties and a series of checks and balances that restricted executive power. Today that regime has changed substantially. Following the script of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Nayib Buekele in El Salvador, in the last ten months the Administration has destroyed the federal bureaucratic apparatus, usurped the powers of the legislature, used government agencies to attack, censor and extort universities, media and opponents, and violated the due process of migrants (and Afro-descendant citizens). The change has been so extreme that Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way have declared that the United States is no longer a democracy but a competitive authoritarianism.
The implications of this process of autocratization in the US for Latin America are catastrophic. Enabled by a compliant Congress and supreme court, whose majorities are more concerned with ideological victories than with the rule of law or civil and political liberties, Trump has managed to function with few constraints. Despite the efforts of district, state and federal courts to block executive orders and actions that violate the Constitution, the President has managed to find mechanisms to avoid adverse decisions or avoid uncomfortable requirements. This is particularly true in areas where the president’s office has traditionally enjoyed a lot of flexibility (and which affect Latin America particularly strongly) such as international aid, migration processes and the fight against drug trafficking.
In one of his first acts in office, Trump suspended and/or eliminated US international aid programs that had previously been approved by Congress. The budget approved by the legislature for 2024 included (among other things) 90 million dollars for democracy promotion programs in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, 125 million to counter the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs in Mexico and combat the production and transshipment of cocaine in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama and Costa Rica and 82.5 million for programs to prevent human trafficking and reduce violence against women in Central America. The end of USAID and the State Department’s democracy promotion and human rights programs are accompanied by measures to end immigration (from the Global South). At the beginning of his term, Trump unexpectedly suspended the US asylum and refugee program and ended the temporary protection programs for more than 600,000 Haitian and Venezuelan migrants.
As if that were not enough, since March the administration has used the immigration police (ICE) to detain and deport migrants without due process. By September 2025, ICE had detained more than 59,000 people (71.5 percent of them without criminal convictions) and had deported 234,210 — in many cases without a court order. The arrest and deportation process has been so arbitrary and chaotic that 170 American citizens have been killed in the raids. People arrested by ICE (citizens or not, regular migrants or not) are subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment and frequently end up missing in the immigration prison system, or deported to other countries, without being able to contact family members or their lawyers. For those of us who grew up in Latin America watching or learning about the human rights violations of dictators like Rafael Videla or Augusto Pinochet, the images of plainclothes ICE agents in balaclavas, refusing to identify themselves or produce a judicial arrest warrant, while loading people into unmarked cars, are macabrely familiar.
The consequences of these migration policies are particularly severe for Latin America. Not only do they put our compatriots at risk, but they reduce the number of migrants in the United States, either because the authorities arrest them and deport them, or because people who already live in the country decide to leave out of fear. In the long term, the decrease in citizens living and earning in dollars closes what until now had been an escape valve in countries with weak economies. According to a report from the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances range from 0.1 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in Argentina to 27.6 percent of the GDP in Nicaragua. Countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala receive a fifth of their income from remittances sent by family members from abroad. Not all remittances come from the United States, but 60 percent of them come from North America.
The attack on migrants, the closure of legal entry options to the United States and the end of economic aid funds to the region add to the decision of the North American government to use military force against Venezuela. In the last three months, the US has attacked Venezuelan (and also Colombian) vessels that – they maintain – were transporting drugs. These attacks not only violate international laws, but also reflect worrying changes in the protection of the rule of law in the United States. In a liberal democracy, the security apparatus cannot be prosecutor, judge and executioner. Even if there is evidence that these vessels are carrying drugs (which is not entirely clear), due process requires stopping the vessel, searching for evidence of the drugs, and subjecting its crew members to a trial where it is decided whether they are guilty or not and what sentence is assigned to them.
The use of “war” language by the Trump Administration, coupled with the increase in military force in the Caribbean and the sanction of covert intelligence operations in Venezuela, constitutes a clearly inflammatory policy. Some senators are worried that the President will end up unilaterally declaring war. An unprecedented step that would certainly be devastating for the region.
All this leads me to one last reflection. The support that the US gives to democratic (or authoritarian) leaders and regimes has been absolutely essential for the stability of democracies (or dictatorships) in the region. In the last two decades, democracy on the continent has been threatened and weakened in several countries. To overthrow dictatorships in Venezuela or El Salvador, and protect democracy in countries like Argentina, Colombia, or Guatemala, strong democratic allies are needed capable of exerting pressure that complements the efforts of pro-democratic movements. The Trump Administration’s erratic policy with Venezuela, unconditional support for leaders with authoritarian tendencies such as Nayib Bukele or Javier Milei and threats to populist leaders such as Gustavo Petro contribute to political polarization, promote impunity, increase the influence of autocratic powers such as China and Russia, destabilize democratic regimes and weaken leaders and organizations that promote democracy in the region.
It is difficult to know if and how democratic erosion in the US will advance. Despite important victories, the excesses of the Trump Administration are mobilizing the opposition within the country. With any luck this mobilization can stop the authoritarian impulses of this Administration. But until this happens, it is difficult to count on the US to protect or advance democracy and human rights in the region. So far, the response to this new reality has been relatively fragmented and—in some countries—improvised.
The region would do well to seek collective responses, strengthen democratic regional leadership and jointly prepare for the blows of the Trump Administration.