As Syria reshapes its features in a sensitive transitional phase, southern Syria returns to form a renewed focus of attention, in which the interests of 4 active powers intersect: Syria, Russia, Turkey, and finally the Israeli occupation.
The initiative to redeploy Russian patrols in southern Syria stands out as an option, given the possibility of rearranging field balances and reducing the possibility of escalation.
Media reported that President Ahmed Al-Sharaa discussed this proposal with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, during his recent visit to Moscow, in a step through which Damascus seeks to avoid an explosion in the south, through a mechanism that it had previously tested during the era of the ousted regime.
This mechanism is consistent with Moscow’s efforts to maintain its influence, and with the aspirations of the new Syrian government to consolidate stability without a direct clash with the Israeli occupation.
Damascus gains
The Russian deployment in the south does not represent merely circumstantial security arrangements for Syria. Rather, it provides the opportunity to reduce repeated Israeli attacks and gradually restore control over one of the most fragile and complex fronts since the beginning of the crisis.
The Russian newspaper “Kommersant” previously reported that the Syrian authorities are showing interest in resuming Russian military police patrols in the southern governorates, similar to what was the situation before the overthrow of the ousted regime.
The newspaper quoted a source who attended Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani’s meeting with the Syrian community in Moscow at the end of last July, that Damascus sees this proposal as an effective means to “reduce Israeli military operations” that are being carried out under the pretext of establishing a buffer zone or to protect the Druze community in southern Syria.
This information was initially part of Russian leaks that preceded Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow, but it intersects with what was published by Reuters, citing Syrian sources, who indicated that the Syrian delegation that visited Russia sought guarantees from Moscow, Most notable:
- Preventing support for the remnants of the previous regime.
- Help build the new Syrian army.
- Redeployment of Russian military police in the south, as a means of reducing the escalation with Israel.
In this context, Khaled Khalil, an expert in Syrian-Israeli relations, says that Damascus is trying, through these patrols, to reset its relationship with Moscow within a new vision of the Russian role in the south, which is not limited only to calm, but rather constitutes an umbrella of balance at a delicate stage.
Khalil continued to Al Jazeera that Damascus is trying in this transitional phase, and in light of the limited resources and the difficult internal situation, not to give up its sovereignty over the south, but in return it is facing Israeli arrogance and repeated attacks, which makes the idea of Russian deployment a realistic and acceptable option, as part of a strategy to impose sovereignty through available tools, without being drawn into a direct confrontation.
Moscow’s gateway to regaining influence
Moscow, in addition to seeking to establish its military presence in the Hmeimim and Tartous bases in the west of the country, is moving to consolidate its influence in southern Syria, in an attempt to restore its role as a guarantor force after a major setback it suffered with the fall of its old ally, the ousted regime.
The official Russian statements, led by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s condemnation of the repeated Israeli raids on targets inside Syria, came to confirm that Moscow is still present on the Syrian scene.
In this context, Dmitry Brega, director of the Arab Studies Unit at the Center for Arab-Eurasian Studies, believes that the return of Russian patrols to southern Syria represents a strategic shift that returns Moscow to the heart of the Syrian scene after a period of relative absence.
In his interview with Al Jazeera Net, Breja pointed out that this step does not come only for field reasons, but also carries political and security dimensions aimed at establishing Russian influence as a guarantor of balance between local and regional powers.
Through this step, Russia is trying to remind everyone that it is still the only party capable of ensuring a minimum level of stability in Syria, as it holds the strings of the field game and has channels of communication with Damascus, Ankara, and Tel Aviv at the same time, adds Breja.
A study issued by the Jusoor Center for Studies showed that the number of Russian force points in southern Syria in the year 2023 reached 9 locations, and the last observation point where Russian forces were positioned was on the “Red Hill” site above the Golan Heights.
Russia withdrew its forces from southern Syria after the fall of the regime and from all Syrian governorates, with the exception of the Hmeimim and Tartous bases in the west of the country.
Türkiye and Israel
The Israeli occupation government has previously expressed its increasing concern about Turkish expansion into Syria, especially in light of the great political rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus following the fall of the previous regime, and the circulation of information about Turkey’s intention to establish military bases in the center of the country, in addition to military support and training of Syrian forces in Turkish territory.
In a previous report by Reuters, citing 4 informed sources, it was reported that Israel pressured Washington to keep Syria weak and without a strong centrality, by allowing Russia to retain its military bases in Hmeimim and Tartous, as a means of balancing the rising Turkish influence.
The sources pointed out that the already tense relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv worsened during the genocidal war on Gaza, as Israeli officials informed their American counterparts that the “new Islamic rulers” in Syria pose a real threat to the northern borders.
Israel’s concern about Iran
Regarding the traditional Israeli concern about the Iranian presence in southern Syria, the former Russian envoy to Syria before the fall of the regime, Alexander Lavrontiev, previously stated that the establishment of additional Russian observation points in the south aims to reassure the Israeli side that Iranian armed groups will not have the upper hand in those areas.
For its part, the Russian newspaper “Kommersant” quoted an Israeli source as saying that Tel Aviv’s position on the resumption of Russian patrols depends on several factors, Most notable:
- The nature of bilateral agreements with Moscow.
- The position that Russia will adopt if a new understanding is reached with the current Syrian government.
Russian affairs researcher Dmitry Bregea says that Israel views the Russian deployment in the south as an “indirect security guarantee,” as it sees Moscow as a party with which it can be reached on a clear field basis, far from the chaos that might cause other parties.
He adds that Russian patrols constitute, in Israel’s view, a means to contain the chaos, prevent escalation on the southern border, and ensure the stability of the Golan as much as possible.
But researcher Khaled Khalil rules out at this stage that Israel will agree to any presence of official Syrian forces in the south, pointing out that the current Israeli government with extreme right-wing tendencies still insists on completely neutralizing the northern front.
Khalil suggests that perhaps after the change in the composition of government in Tel Aviv, the Russian military police may become a guarantor and an alternative to the presence of Syrian forces on the northern border of Israel.
Accounts for Ankara
The Russian move in southern Syria cannot be separated from the broader scene of Russian-Turkish understandings, whose roots go back to the “Astana” and “Sochi” agreements during the first years of the Syrian revolution.
These understandings practically drew maps of control and lines of contact between the regime and the opposition, and resulted in joint Russian-Turkish patrols on the M4 international road between Aleppo and Latakia, passing through Damascus.
While the arrangements for the south are being re-examined today, Ankara appears to be closely following developments, and is showing what looks like conditional acceptance of the Russian presence in the south of the country, as it does not conflict with its direct security interests, but may serve common goals.
Military expert Brigadier General Abdullah Al-Asaad says that there are preliminary understandings between Syria and Russia, which are managed in coordination with common allies, most notably Turkey, adding that “Ankara now sees Moscow as a more serious partner in supporting the stability of Syria, especially after the American path disappointed its hopes.”
Al-Asaad confirms to Al-Jazeera Net that there is an implicit Syrian-Turkish agreement on a Russian role in the south, and that the Turkish ally was the one who instructed the Syrian leadership to head towards Moscow to activate this option.
This approach is reinforced by a recent study issued by the Taqaddam Center for Policy, which confirmed that Turkey organized the visit of the Syrian delegation to Moscow, which included the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence, and that it does not oppose the presence of Russian forces in the south of the country, nor does it consider it a direct competition inside Syria.
In the same context, the Turkish researcher in international relations, Mehmet Raqiboğlu, believes that Ankara views Syrian-Russian cooperation positively, as long as it does not affect its strategic interests.
The Kurdish danger
In his interview with Al Jazeera Net, Oglu added that Turkey seeks to end the threat of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its military arm linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and therefore supports any move that limits its expansion north or south, including Russian moves that take place in coordination with Ankara.
This trend was evident in a remarkable step at the beginning of last August, when Russia conducted a military patrol near Qamishli in northeastern Syria, without the participation of SDF forces, after a series of Syrian-Russian meetings in Moscow.
This step was considered by observers to be an indication of a clear shift in the map of field alliances, and the gradual exclusion of SDF from the arrangements for the Syrian future, in a way that serves Turkish calculations in the region.