Henry Kissinger was, for many, the personification of realpolitik: a diplomat who saw peace not as the result of ideals, but as the result of power and balance between States. Former Secretary of State for Richard Nixon, he negotiated the ceasefire in Vietnam, the diplomatic opening of China and the détente policy with the Soviet Union. For Kissinger, peace could only be achieved in two circumstances: through the hegemony of one side or through the balance of power between rivals.
This pragmatic vision reappeared in his reflections on the war in Ukraine. Before he died, already a centenarian, in 2023, he argued that the conflict should end quickly, even if this implied territorial concessions on the part of Kiev. He warned European countries not to be tempted to “crush” Russia, as this could destabilize the continent in the long term. He asked the Ukrainians to respond with “wisdom” to the “heroism they demonstrated”, suggesting that they seek a pragmatic solution in the face of a great nuclear power with vital interests at stake.
His words divided opinions. Many accused him of legitimizing Russian aggression and proposing unfair concessions at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty. Others saw them as a realistic warning to prevent the war from turning into a prolonged and devastating conflict for all of Europe.
The human cost of war is overwhelming. Independent estimates point to more than 150,000 dead Russian soldiers, while Kiev estimates that Russia’s total casualties have exceeded one million men since February 2022. On the Ukrainian side, Russia has already returned more than 15,000 military bodies in 2025 alone, bringing the number of confirmed deaths to tens of thousands. The tragedy is not limited to combatants: thousands of civilians lost their lives and millions were forced to flee their homes. These numbers reinforce the urgency of a negotiated solution, as Kissinger advocated, to prevent the conflict from prolonging indefinitely.
Almost three years later, the ongoing negotiations seem to be getting closer to the solution that Kissinger anticipated: territorial concessions and preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. It is legitimate to ask whether the human and material suffering endured by the Ukrainian people over recent years was worth it and whether it would have been possible to reach a ceasefire sooner.
Peace is made with enemies, not with friends. And if it takes courage to wage war, sometimes it takes even more courage to make peace. President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a difficult choice, one that concerns not just the current conflict, but the security of the continent in the decades to come.
What this conflict demonstrated is that neither side achieved hegemony. Russia was unable to subdue Ukraine, nor fully reintegrate it into its sphere of influence. The West, in turn, was unable to provoke Russia’s implosion through a proxy war. Of the two hypotheses proposed by Kissinger, the balance of power remains as the path to peace and stability. In this scenario, the European Union will have a decisive role, by strengthening its military capacity, to ensure the necessary deterrent capacity, within the framework of a renewed detente with Russia. And, at the same time, it is necessary for the European Union to support the reconstruction of Ukraine and promote its integration from an economic point of view.
Director of Diário de Notícias