The rivalries between East and West are today more visible than ever in the European Union and neighboring countries. The recent elections in Romania, Georgia and Moldova demonstrate that Russia and its allies spare no expense in trying to influence voters, manipulate elections and change the foreign policy direction of other states.
In most cases, they don’t succeed. The EU, with the firm and visible support of its institutions and leaders, has reacted decisively in support of pro-Western actors and against Russian disinformation.
Now, despite having achieved impressive results, there are also setbacks.
Although Romania and Moldova have elected pro-European leaders, Georgia’s aspirations to join the EU have stalled. It is also unclear whether the new governments will be able to resolve internal divisions or whether future elections will end up being a bitter fight between the EU and Russia.
To address this situation, the EU may sometimes need to adopt a minimalist strategy. Specifically, In the cases of Hungary and Serbia, excessive intervention can be counterproductive.
Image of protesters in the streets of Belgrade against the Vučić government.
EFE
Highly visible support for democratic movements and pro-European politicians can create the image that they are “Western puppets,” which is precisely what illiberal leaders intend when they accuse pro-Western opponents of being “foreign agents.” Discretion, working behind closed doors and a more reactive attitude can alleviate these problems.
In Hungary and Serbia, respectively, Viktor Orbán y Aleksandar Vucic They have consolidated state capture since the 2010s.
Hungary, once an example of post-communist success, is today one of the poorest members of the EU.
Serbia, with its legacy of armed conflict and its complicated democratic transition, is the last of the Western Balkan candidates to join the EU in terms of democratic behavior.
Both share an ideology of evasion, pro-Russian and anti-European positions and vague rhetoric about protecting sovereignty “at any price.”
However, the two regimes today face their greatest internal obstacle: the rise of rivals and strong and credible mass movements. The roots of discontent are also similar: economic stagnation, rampant inflation and corruption.
Scandals have served as catalysts.
In Hungary, the presidential pardon in a pedophile case prompted the creation of a new party chaired by the former member of the regime Péter Hungarian. In Serbia, the collapse of the Novi Sad station awning sparked massive anti-government protests.
“It is striking that the Kremlin has published almost identical political analyzes on Budapest and Belgrade, in which they accuse the EU of trying to overthrow the current leaders and install ‘puppet governments’ loyal to ‘European liberal elites'”
For the first time in almost a decade, both governments face an opposition capable of taking them down.
International actors are observing the events in detail. Russia, of course, is not simply monitoring the situation, as the EU says.
Moscow shamelessly finances certain political parties and experts in the two countries, in addition to spreading disinformation about Orbán and Vučić’s opponents through state media and the Serbian Orthodox Church.
It is striking that Kremlin-led institutions have published almost identical political analyzes on Budapest and Belgrade, accusing the EU of trying to overthrow the current leaders and install “puppet governments” loyal to “European liberal elites.” They criticize the independent media, the Serbian protesters and the Hungarian Péter Magyar, whom they describe as pawns in a plan to launch “color revolutions” similar to those of the Maidan in the neighboring region.
These arguments are in line with Russia’s disinformation playbook. In a normal situation, they would have little impact, but in Hungary and Serbia, The pro-government media spread them as if they were sacred texts.
It is difficult to know exactly how convincing Russian disinformation is, but something is pervasive. In the polarized Hungarian society, the Russian discourse, amplified by Orbán, reinforces the opinions of its base.
The case of Serbia is more complex. Deep historical and cultural ties to the Kremlin make it fertile ground for his influence, which often underpins Vučić’s power.
However, the protests that the students began now rally Serbs today regardless of political divisions, even those who sympathize with Russia. Under these circumstances, Moscow has little room to bring disillusioned citizens back to Vučić’s side.
“In Hungary, where Orbán has made hostility towards Brussels a central theme of his campaign, any visible EU support for another candidate risks directly benefiting the prime minister”
The EU is right to remain alert and act against Russian interferencebut Hungary and Serbia can test this principle.
In Hungary, where Orbán has made hostility towards Brussels a central theme of his campaign, any visible EU support for another candidate risks directly benefiting the prime minister.
His propaganda machine is already proclaiming that Magyar is a “lapdog” of EU leaders. A public announcement in his favor would only serve to reinforce that image.
In Serbia, the protests are not about the dilemma between Russia and the EU, but against corruption and authoritarianism. The EU’s tough attitude corroborates Vučić’s argument that the protesters are “foreign agents” sponsored by Brussels.
The strength of the movement lies in its transversal appeal. If the protesters are described as “pro-European”, part of their base could distance themselves.
It is to the EU’s credit that, until now, it has acted cautiously. However, as the Hungarian elections approach and Serbian authorities are resorting to violence against protesters, Brussels must take into account that excessive intervention may have more drawbacks than benefits.
*** Ferenc Németh is a resident of Budapest, an expert on the Western Balkans and a doctoral student at Corvinus University.
*** Péter Krekó is director of the Political Capital Institute in Budapest and policy researcher at the European University Institute.