The General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) is going through an internal crisis. The members, divided into blocks, have taken their disagreements to the public arena in a fight that projects an embarrassing image of the governing body of the judges.
In the midst of this noise, justice and independence remain, once again, in the background.
A little over a year ago, the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) was renewed, after more than five years of expired mandate and a long period in office that ended up blocking the system.
This blockade damaged, as expected, the very functioning of justice.
The long-awaited renewal sparked excitement and promises of change. A new CGPJ had before it the opportunity to do things differently, to rebuild its image and regain citizens’ trust in justice.
Time has made it clear that that hope was unfounded and that the change remained apparent. The CGPJ continues to function with the same vices that weighed down its predecessors, nothing essential has changed and disappointment has set in.
The president of the Supreme Court and the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), Isabel Perelló, together with King Felipe VI.
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The CGPJ should be a technical, plural and autonomous body in its operation. Its main function, if not the essential one, is to guarantee the independence of judges and courts, when they exercise their judicial function, with respect to the rest of the powers of the State and from everyone, including with respect to the other judicial bodies and those of the Government of the Judiciary itself.
It is so in its constitutional design and in the Organic Law of the Judiciary, but not in its daily practice.
In reality, the CGPJ has become a scene of confrontation between the so-called “progressive and conservative blocs”, inappropriate labels for a judicial governing bodybut already assumed naturally in public discourse.
The recent statement from the self-proclaimed progressive members (in which they denounce the “breakdown of consensus” and the “exclusion of the progressive bloc”) makes this evident. The CGPJ does not discuss legal criteria or judicial management models (the management of the administration of justice is another of its functions), but rather the distribution of power.
There is more talk about balance than merits.
The statement clearly reflects a Council that behaves like a “political” schoolyard, with two opposing sides demanding their quota of representation and denouncing the other for “breaking the rules of the game.” The open fight between the members, shamelessly displayed before the public, is an embarrassing spectacle for an institution that should represent balance and serenity.
Meanwhile, what is essential (judicial independence and good public service of justice) is diluted between crossed accusations and group strategies.
The politicization of the CGPJ is especially noticeable in discretionary appointments.
The data is eloquent. Of 120 appointments made during this period, excluding jurists of recognized competence, prosecutors, autonomous and military legal shifts, three out of four fell to the two associations present in the body (the Professional Association of the Judiciary, APM, and Judges for Democracy, JJpD).
The other two associations, Francisco de Vitoria (AJFV) and Foro Judicial Independiente (FJI), barely appear, as do half of the judicial career, which does not belong to any association.
This distribution does not reflect the real plurality of the judiciary. In reality, it shows something deeper, a bias that comes from origin.
“Many magistrates with brilliant careers are left out of high judicial appointments simply because they do not belong to the appropriate block”
The CGPJ, elected by the political parties, acts as a transmission belt for those same parties. The members, grouped in blocks, reproduce the loyalties of those who appointed them.
Not all of them, of course, but the overall effect is the same.
And, meanwhile, many magistrates with brilliant careers are left out of high judicial appointments simply because they do not belong to the right block.
The unanimity that is so celebrated in plenary sessions is not proof of consensus, but rather the result of a prior agreement between closed groups. So many of yours, so many of mine.
When there is no agreement, the appointment is blocked. This has happened, for example, with presidencies of chambers of the Supreme Court.
The result is a questioned Council, an unmotivated judicial career and a citizenry that perceives justice as a terrain colonized by politics. A perception that undermines public trust and discourages those who, in ordinary courts, try to exercise their function independently.
Breaking this circle requires going to the root and involves allowing the judges to elect the twelve judicial members of the Council.
Faced with the two proposals that the so-called conservative and progressive blocs brought to the Venice Commission, there is a third way.
It exists, and it is what we could call a Third judicial Spain.
This is proposed by the joint initiative of the Francisco de Vitoria Judicial Association and the Independent Judicial Forum, which defends a direct, proportional election system with qualified voting, in accordance with European standards and endorsed by the Venice Commission itself.
It is not about replacing parties with associations, but rather about ensuring real and plural representation of the entire judicial career (associates and non-associates), that guarantees the presence of all sensitivities in the CGPJ.
The model is simple and reasonable. Open lists, telematic voting, participation of all judges and a process whose organization would be the responsibility of the CGPJ and would be controlled by the Central Electoral Board and by the auditors appointed by the associations and groups of voters.
It is about returning to the judicial career the responsibility of choosing judicial members, without political filters or power quotas. Not to reinforce corporatism, but to restore the legitimacy and independence that the Constitution wanted to protect.
“It is time to break the circle and return the CGPJ to its original meaning, which is none other than to guarantee judicial independence, not to serve power”
It is not surprising that many citizens see justice contaminated by politics. That perception not only erodes public trust. It also affects the spirit of those who, every day, They uphold justice from their courts.
Regenerating the Council is not a corporate gesture, it is a democratic demand. If the appointments are distributed between blocks, if the members act as party delegates, if the Council itself becomes a schoolyard and excellence is replaced by political balance, Justice loses its voice and citizens lose their guarantee.
It is time to break the circle and return the CGPJ to its original meaning, which is none other than to guarantee judicial independence, not to serve power.
Only in this way can renewal finally be a beginning and not a simple replacement.
Only in this way will the Council recover its true purpose: to serve independence, not the current interests.
The question is whether there will be enough courage to do it. And if one day we will get to see it.
*** María Emma Ortega Herrero is a judge at the Contentious-Administrative Court number 13 of Seville and a member of the Francisco de Vitoria Judicial Association.