“We are neither left nor right. We are the generation that got tired of bowing our heads,” reads one of the posts on the Instagram account “We are Generation Z Mexico“Due to the attention paid to it, it is a defensive play due to suspicions that behind the march convened on November 15 rocks the cradle of partisan interests. What is the truth? Does spontaneity or some puppeteer act? In times of alleged bubbles, where it is debated whether the artificial intelligence will meet the high expectations, one wonders whether the so-called ‘zoomers’ They are just air—of the FRENA type—or, on the other hand, they emerge as a disruptive political force.
Elementary for any analysis is to start with the clinical picture on a global scale. Unlike millennials, those also called ‘centennials‘They were born in the age of the mass internet. They are digital natives who routinely consume videos on TikTok and Instagram, socialize less in person and more from a phone or a video game console, and face multiple risks of precariousness in a world of uncertainties. They are recurrent victims of stress and anxiety. They cultivate and avoid loneliness. They inherited distrust in institutions and governments from their parents, and place their hopes for systemic change in technology. Of course, there are nuances in plurality. The devil inhabits the idiosyncratic details.
As in other countries, Generation Z Mexico uses popular culture icons to make causes visible. For example, he adopted as his emblem a skull with a straw hat from the popular Japanese manga One Piecewhere the ideals of freedom from the World Government mobilize the protagonist Luffy and his crew. Certainly, the importation of symbols suggests a legitimate cosmopolitan urban bias. A common trait in young generations is taking advantage of the low barriers to entry to other cultures to embrace universal values. This naturalness of contact with the outside should not be underestimated by those who collect gray hair.
There is a key differentiator between the global Generation Z and its Mexican cell. Abroad, material demands are recurring. In Peru, he protested against the pension reform of unpopular former president Dina Boluarte. In Morocco, he demonstrated against inequality and the precariousness of health and education services. In Madagascar, they mobilized due to the lack of water and electricity. In France, he repudiated austerity. Beyond exceptions such as the protests for reproductive rights in the United States and against corruption in Nepal, a question arises: why in Mexico does the material dimension not trigger a youth social outbreak?
There is a clue to test the political mood of Generation Z. Unlike their counterparts in Peru and Nepal, centennials approve of the work of Morenista presidents. Mendoza Blanco—the pollster more accurate in the presidential election—recorded in one of his last liftings pre-election (2024) a general approval of 75 percent for López Obrador, lower than the 87 percent of the 18 to 24 year old age group and 80 percent among those between 25 to 34 years old. Already in the six-year term of Claudia Sheinbaum, a survey of Mitofsky On the occasion of the First Report it showed 73 percent in the 18 to 29 year old group. In short, centennials do not seem to have the head of the Mexican government as a natural enemy.
What explains the high approval? One hypothesis is that centennials share more demands with other age groups than is assumed. An alternative is that public policies matter, both those of the neoliberal past that at a global level zoomers they reject, like the new ones that Morena champions. This second line is plausible: López Obrador’s six-year term offered specific programs for youth. For example, only the Youth Building the Future program register 3.4 million accumulated beneficiaries. By adding the increases to the minimum wage, together they helped the rate of youth unemployment 15 to 24 years old will drop from 6 percent this year, when between 2009 and 2014 average almost 10 percent, according to the OECD. Later, to accompany policies against youth unemployment, Sheinbaum increased the number of university scholarships and housing actions, with new welfare gains expected.
However, the digital leadership of Generation Z is not a monolithic group. Proof of this is the statement published in Instagram: “Generation Z adopts a neutral, but supportive, position regarding the march called in Mexico City. We reiterate that we are not the organizers.” Other publication in The march called will be a test of legitimacy and will give color to their specific demands, beyond premature calls for a revocation of the mandate. To measure the degree of spontaneity in situ, the recurrence of slogans directed against Morena, the left or the president would be a red flag of artifice; In that case, the stench of partisan interests would evoke that of a corpse.
In short, the activism of a sector of Generation Z is more of an uncertain reality than a bubble. It has not yet managed to appeal to the general public and faces a limited scope due to the legitimacy of the government. A new, more politicized breed would be welcome news for progressivism, although vulture interests are a key deterrent. Although presidential approval rates are high among young people, partly due to policies against job insecurity and poverty, the claims could touch more on a non-material dimension, such as corruption or insecurity, although the delegitimized past creates an easy comparison. But beyond the opportunistic air injected by chavorrucos urged by their own or others’ victories, a sensitive government in an intimidating world must be able to ignore the dry branches of the largest and most established trees that hide the forest. Without these moth-free woods, the new floors of a social transformation would be left unfurnished. The PAN and the PRI forgot it, and that’s how it turned out for them.