The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy states that the United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or fertile environment for extremists, is not subject to the control of any force hostile to the United States, and contributes to the stability of the global energy market.
These priorities are consistent with those of previous administrations, and terrorism, Israel’s well-being, and oil are the main reasons for US interest in the Middle East.
To serve these interests, the United States spends tens of billions of dollars annually trying to manage the affairs of the region. This extended foreign policy has sparked repeated internal criticism, especially from conservative movements that demand focusing spending on America’s interior, and consider that unconditional support for some regional allies is not consistent with the “America First” principle.
In one of the most accurate estimates of cost savings, Eugene Goelz concludes that abandoning the Middle East mission would add between $65 and $70 billion annually to the US treasury.
According to estimates by Justin Logan – at the American think tank Defense Priorities – these policies are costly and confusing, because the region is theoretically a strategically remote region, and its GDP constitutes 3.3% of the global GDP, compared to 32.5% in the Western Hemisphere, and 25% in both Europe and East Asia.
The population of the Middle East ranges between 3.5 and 5% of the total world population, and even if one country controlled – or invaded – a region with those economic and human resources, it would not pose a serious military threat to the United States.
“The belief that the region is of great importance to American national security has relied on vague theories about energy economies, the regional balance of power, and the threat of terrorism,” Logan says.
After Trump’s planned Gaza ceasefire, at the end of September 2025, Will Waldorf, a professor at Wake Forest University, said in Defense One: Washington is giving too much to the Middle East, and it should not now give more to allay frustrations over the Gaza deal, or more broadly to try to find a lasting and transformative solution for the troubled region, which appears to be Trump’s greatest ambition. Instead of intervening deeper in the Middle East, Washington should step back now.
He believes that the two main strategic drivers of deep American involvement in the Middle East over the past five decades – oil and terrorism – no longer constitute major strategic challenges, as the United States is now a net exporter of oil, which means that it is no longer dependent on fossil fuels in the region, and with the defeat of ISIS in 2019 and the general weakness of Al-Qaeda significantly, local actors can deal with the terrorist threat for the most part.
Not a small segment of influential American commentators believe that the costly and inconclusive American wars in the Greater Middle East have not resulted in peace or stability.
Given these experiences, especially the recent ones, American public opinion against what many describe as “endless wars” has reached its peak, and thus political leaders from both parties have become more receptive to the calls for withdrawal that have been put forward for decades.
The late American diplomat Martin Indyk – (died July 25, 2024), who served as US ambassador to Israel twice, and a member of the Jewish lobby group AIPAC in the United States – believed in his article published in the Wall Street Journal that the goals set by the United States in the Cold War era are no longer relevant to the present time.
Pointing out – for example – that the United States’ dependence on Middle Eastern oil has come to an end, stressing that Israel has achieved a level of ability to guarantee its security.
Indyk stresses that both the Palestinian issue and Syria should no longer be a concern of the United States.
He argues that after the great sacrifice of American lives, and the wasting of enormous resources and efforts in misguided endeavors that ultimately resulted in more harm than good, it is necessary for the United States to seek a way to extricate itself from the cycle of crusades and costly and frustrating withdrawals.
This opinion is liked by others who share similar views. They assume that the Middle East is no longer of paramount importance to the United States, and that the American economy is no longer dependent on Arab oil.
Paul Wolfowitz, one of the architects of the US invasion of Iraq, once noted that his shift from focusing on the Middle East to working on East Asia was like “stepping out of a stuffy room into sunlight and fresh air.”
Even among a diminishing minority in Washington who continue to emphasize the importance of the Middle East, the prospect of continuing Arab conflicts, Arab-Israeli conflicts, and conflict-ridden regions such as Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and Iraq raises reluctance and reluctance.
Many political analysts and scholars are now struggling to understand the purpose of the American presence in the Middle East, says Sedat Lagener in Modern Diplomacy.
The attack of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent brutal aggression against Gaza, highlighted the limits of American influence and the growing boldness of regional powers.
As Washington was recalibrating its presence in the Middle East, a complex web of local alliances and rivalries was reshaping the political landscape.
Therefore, it has become among the most important frequently asked questions within the corridors of the power industry institutions in the United States of America, the question of the day following Washington’s expected, gradual and “clean” exit from the “muds” of the Middle East, as some have described.
In this context, the administration of former US President Joe Biden did not hide its desire to remove the United States from the Middle East. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated in an interview – before taking office – that he believes that a Biden presidency will reduce interference in the region, not increase it.
Over the past few decades, one US administration after another has signaled grand plans for a new foreign policy focused on a “turn toward Asia,” made possible by the “withdrawal” from the Middle East.
With each new administration, Middle Eastern governments and their partisan analysts in Washington interpreted every American step in the region as evidence of a withdrawal already underway, and responded to such “alleged” efforts with angry, alarming, and even emotional criticism, describing every step as an “abandonment” of friends, justifying the expansion of relations between Middle Eastern governments, China, or Russia as a natural reactionary hedge, in the words of Sarah Leah Whitson.
This potential “exit” will be considered a seismic turning point that may reinforce what has been established in the solid global political geography that was formed after World War II, and will place the world before a group of anxious questions regarding regional security, conflict resolution, and the emergence of manifestations of new emerging powers in a region that is strategically considered the most dangerous in the world.
Debate still exists over whether reducing US intervention will lead to greater stability or increased volatility.
Optimists believe that local powers may find more sustainable solutions to regional conflicts without external interference, while skeptics fear the possibility of a power vacuum and increased competition between regional actors.
But what is clear is that the region is entering a new phase, where traditional patterns of influence and alliances are being radically reconsidered.
This transformation in the Middle Eastern order goes beyond mere power politics; It represents a fundamental shift in how regional security, economic development, and diplomatic relations are conceptualized and managed.
As this new system takes shape, the ability of regional actors to develop effective mechanisms for conflict resolution and cooperative development will determine whether the Middle East, in light of the decline of American influence, will become more stable or more volatile, according to the expectations of a report by the Jordan Times published on its electronic platform.
Objective researchers have always justified and often defended the American logic of militarizing the Middle East, denying that it was motivated by greed, Christian ideological motives, or even imperialist assumptions, and described those “alleged motives” as “myth.”
American policy has always been torn between two conflicting motives: the need to protect enduring American interests on the one hand, and the desire to avoid the region’s never-ending problems on the other hand.
Paul Wolfowitz – one of the architects of the US invasion of Iraq – once noted that his shift from focusing on the Middle East to working on East Asia was like “coming out of a stuffy room into sunlight and fresh air.”
To borrow this metaphor, American officials have always wanted to walk toward the sunlight while realizing that they cannot completely escape the darkness, said Hal Brands at the Hoover Research Institution.
There are views that confirm that the “withdrawal narrative” was deliberately promoted as a test tool for the intentions of international powers dreaming of removing the United States from its traditional areas of influence. It gives Washington a strategic opportunity to explore the behavior of newcomers such as China in the region, in light of the perceived feeling of American absence.
While the Chinese leadership is reluctant to step out of its comfort zone, American decision-makers want to know more about Beijing’s true intentions and capabilities, especially if they will brave the treacherous waters of the Middle East.
But despite the strategic gains resulting from promoting – which some consider “successful promotion” – the narrative of withdrawal, the facts on the ground refute this myth.
The United States maintains its dominance in arms sales, accounting for 54% of global sales, and holds a large share (78%) of arms imports to some countries in the region, says Burak Al-Mali, a researcher at TRT World in Istanbul.
It remains to point out – here – that sober reports were consistent in highlighting the crisis of self-confidence that the United States faced in this turbulent and security-fragile region, following its setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These reports recommend that Washington not repeat the mistakes of its previous experiences in these two countries, but rather that it deal with the region by reviewing the experiences and subjecting the failures to examination and reflection.
In this context, Sedat Lagener quotes from the book The Great Illusion by Stephen Simon, part of his explanations regarding the reasons for America’s losses in the Middle East over four decades.
He identifies the decisive factor in Americans’ lack of understanding of the region, stressing that if Washington wants to ensure success in the Middle East, it must abandon imposing its unilateral policies, and instead give priority to listening to its allies in the region.
It remains a postulate at the top of the postulates and constants of any power that dreams of ascending to the top of the powers with an audible voice in the world.
Given the geostrategic and cultural importance it embodies, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that long-term global hegemony, and tightening control over the wheel of the world, is a goal that cannot be achieved by any power that fails to exercise hegemony over the Middle East region in the long term.
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.