What is happening between Trump, Zelensky and Putin, in this autumn of 2025, goes far beyond the conventional dimension of diplomatic theater. After returning to the White House, Trump brought with him the same impulse of unpredictability that we know him so well, but he now finds opponents with his own maneuver and allies who are less predictable than would be desirable. Zelensky, for example, may seem like an easy target at first glance, but there is nothing submissive about his strategy. On the contrary: the unreserved acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire was, for many, a capitulation; For those who coldly analyze power dynamics, this is a move that forces Washington to assume unwanted responsibilities, forcing Trump to confront the fact that prolonging the conflict can no longer be presented as pure patriotism.
While Zelensky’s maneuver forced Washington into calculated inaction, with Putin, the ritual continues, but the script is losing strength. Since 2022, the Kremlin has been multiplying threats: each time it promises that the West will reinforce its military support, that there will be an escalation – sometimes it is the use of hypersonic missiles, sometimes nuclear test tubes, sometimes new “red lines” that the West would be about to cross. In practice, the scenario resembles the old Peter and the Wolf fable: the catastrophe was announced so many times that credibility was diluted. With each warning of nuclear apocalypse or promise of structural change in the conflict, the effect fades. And, in an even more far-fetched version of the same tale, Putin repeatedly offers openings for dialogue and negotiation – always ready for meetings, available for summits, but invariably unable to materialize any compromise in his maximalist position and any concrete solution. The repetition of the empty gesture weakens the Russian president’s own symbolic capital and places Moscow in a secondary place in the theater of power where it would like to be the absolute protagonist.
Economic pressure worsens this drift. The nineteenth European sanctions package, reinforced by the American embargoes on Rosneft and Lukoil, hits the Russian economic and financial apparatus hard. The answer is not just bellicose rhetoric – names such as Kiril Dmitriev, the technocrat responsible for managing funds, are beginning to appear in the corridors of the Kremlin, the technocracy called upon to manage damage and propose pragmatic concessions. Russia realizes that theatricality and muscular narrative are no longer enough: calculation and pragmatism are needed, and Putin himself ends up involved in circumstances that he does not fully control.
All of this takes place under the watchful eye of Beijing. China supports Moscow whenever it suits it, becoming a key player in the energy chessboard and simultaneously providing a target for Trump to exploit the route of indirect pressure. Washington, for its part, hesitates: postponing summits, wavering on sending Tomahawks to Kiev, and fueling internal divisions between isolationists and hawks. The episode of the postponement of the meeting between Trump and Putin – justified by “logistical issues”, but basically a sign of discomfort in the face of the unpredictability of the scenario – illustrates the strategic instability of the moment.
Trump, true to himself, prefers to maintain uncertainty – he wants to claim media credit for an outcome, but recoils at the costs of an open confrontation. However, as time passes, each protagonist’s space becomes narrower: the scenarios multiply less and the limits of action become increasingly evident. Today, everything is no longer unpredictable; on the contrary, there is an inevitable concession to the logic of facts and the erosion of margins for maneuver.
The story doesn’t end here. But it is increasingly evident that, behind the spectacle, the command of the script becomes diffuse and the paths narrow. It remains to be seen who will know how to maneuver in the little remaining space — and who will watch the curtain fall.
Strategy, Security and Defense Analyst